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Abstract
The experiences of many transitional justice mechanisms have led to a general
consensus on the central importance of local legitimacy and local ownership; this
indeed is repeatedly avowed by both the UN and the EU in their prescriptions on
effective transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, I argue that the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers was established in the absence of both. The court was not created in
response to domestic pressure from within Kosovo; rather, it was the result of
external pressure which by definition compromised local ownership and legitima-
cy. Drawing on the findings from first-hand qualitative research, I demonstrate
that the court’s local legitimacy has not improved since its establishment. This
lack of legitimacy, I argue, has potentially negative implications as, without
popular legitimacy, the court’s proceedings and judgements are unlikely to com-
mand sufficient public support to either catalyse the societal changes promised by
the court’s external sponsors, or withstand opposition to the court from within the
Kosovo Albanian population resulting from any perceived slight against the
‘heroic’ KLA.
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Introduction
In August 2015, the ‘Kosovo Specialist Chambers’1 (KSC) was established by the
Kosovo Assembly.2 The KSC is tasked with investigating crimes allegedly committed
by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the course of the civil war which took place
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in Kosovo—then a province of Serbia within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—in
the late 1990s. Specifically, the KSC has jurisdiction over crimes committed, or
commenced, in Kosovo between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2000. The KSC
is seen as part of a renewed global trend in favour of ‘hybrid’ tribunals (Hobbs 2016,
485; Stahn 2016) as, although the court is based on Kosovo’s constitution and was
formally established by the Kosovo Assembly, it is located in The Hague, paid for by
the EU and staffed exclusively by non-Kosovo citizens.
The KSC was, from its inception characterised by two features; first, it was
established as a result of external pressure, and second, those advocating for its
establishment presented the court as a means by which Kosovo’s communities—
especially the Albanians and the Serbs—would achieve not only justice but also
‘reconciliation’ and thereby enable Kosovo to move towards a new more prosperous
and peaceful future. Thus, whilst the court is nominally a judicial body tasked with
judging alleged criminality, it has been justified from its inception as essential to
facilitating transitional justice and societal progress in Kosovo, as well as enabling
Kosovo to further integrate into the international system (US Embassy in Kosovo 2015;
EU External Action 2015).
The KSC is not, of course, the first such judicial body to have been established to
deal with crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia; the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993, was likewise based
in The Hague and similarly presented as more than just a means by which criminal
liability could be established; the ICTY was routinely defended on the grounds that in
addition to prosecuting those responsible for criminality, it would contribute to recon-
ciliation amongst communities throughout the former Yugoslavia and ultimately pro-
mote regional stability (Cassese 2004; del Ponte 2007; Fletcher Forum of International
Affairs 2013). Yet, as discussed later in this article, the ICTY’s record of actually
achieving reconciliation and facilitating transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia has
been the subject of much criticism, with many arguing that the ICTY either failed to
promote reconciliation, or in fact hindered this process (Subotić 2014, 172). A key
problem regularly cited in this critical literature is that the ICTY lacked local legitima-
cy; the absence of any national control over, or involvement in, the establishment and
proceedings of the ICTY, coupled with the court’s physical distance from the former
Yugoslavia, and its lack of engagement with people on the ground, meant that the ICTY
was largely perceived—by all national groups—as ‘alien’ and ultimately illegitimate
(Garbett 2012; Milanovic 2016; Subotić 2009a).
The experiences of the ICTY—and indeed many other international courts framed as
contributing to transitional justice—have thus led to a general consensus on the central
importance of legitimacy and local ownership (Leebaw 2008, 97; Hoogenboom 2009;
Subotić 2009b; Hobbs 2016). Indicatively, Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein
note, ‘perceptions of international courts are critical. These tribunals must be seen as
legitimate by those on whose behalf they operate in order for their work to be accepted
within affected societies’ (2004, 30). The need for local legitimacy is, indeed,
recognised as especially important in the case of hybrid tribunals/courts as, by defini-
tion, they are more remote than national bodies; as Harry Hobbs notes, ‘without
legitimacy, the promised benefits of hybrid courts will be lost’ (2016, 495). Such views
have also been repeatedly expressed by both the UN and the EU in their various
prescriptions on establishing effective transitional justice mechanisms.
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Yet, despite the need for local legitimacy and local ownership being arguably the
most widely avowed ‘lesson’ from previous international courts and tribunals, in this
article, I argue that the KSC was established in the absence of both. The court was not
created in response to domestic pressure from within Kosovo; rather, it was the result of
a sustained campaign of external pressure. Thus, whilst the UN and EU have articu-
lated normative prescriptions stressing the need for local legitimacy and local owner-
ship, the KSC could not have been established if it were not for pressure exercised by
external actors—including the EU—which by definition compromised both.
Drawing on the findings from first-hand qualitative research,3 I demonstrate that the
KSC’s perceived legitimacy amongst Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian communities
remains low; the general public’s understanding of the KSC’s procedures and remit is
poor, and despite the KSC’s public relations campaign, negative propaganda about the
court continues to proliferate. This is, I demonstrate, largely due to the fact that there are
no political parties willing to publicly support the KSC in Kosovo, and the government
has neglected to aid civil society efforts to bolster popular perceptions of the KSC. The
KSC’s lack of legitimacy, I argue finally, has potentially grave implications as, without
popular legitimacy, the KSC’s proceedings and judgements are unlikely to command
sufficient public support to either catalyse the societal changes promised by the court’s
external sponsors, or withstand opposition from within the Kosovo Albanian population
resulting from any perceived slight against the ‘heroic’ KLA.
Establishing the Kosovo Specialist Chambers
In 2008, former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte alleged that members of the
KLA had engaged in serious and systematic war crimes—including organ harvest-
ing—before, during and after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (2008, 284).
The organ harvesting allegations in particular prompted widespread global revul-
sion, and an investigation was subsequently launched by the Council of Europe
(CoE). In 2011, the CoE published its findings in what has come to be known as the
‘Marty Report’ (Council of Europe 2011). The report essentially endorsed Del
Ponte’s allegations, and specifically accused senior Kosovo Albanian politicians—
most notably the then Foreign Minister and former KLA leader Hasim Thaci—of
having been involved in the criminality.
3 This comprised a series of face-to-face interviews conducted with civil society groups working on transi-
tional justice in Kosovo, Serbia and Croatia, and telephone interviews with international transitional justice
activists and experts. The author also conducted face-to-face interviews with representatives from the KSC
based in The Hague, Netherlands; a complete list of interviews conducted is provided at the end of the
reference list. Additionally, the author convened three workshops in Pristina; one with Kosovo Albanians, one
with Kosovo Serbs and another with representatives from Kosovo’s political parties. The workshops with the
Albanians/Serbs were held to garner the views of non-expert citizens; the choice of participants was a function
of the fact that the proceedings of the KSC are primarily orientated towards events involving Albanians and
Serbs. These workshops were held at the Rochester Institute of Technology, Pristina, on the 26th and 27th
April 2018 in collaboration with the Centre for Peace and Conflict, and co-convened with Dr. Mark Baskin,
Research Director of the centre. Participants at the workshop took part on condition that their contributions
would be anonymised. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
Additional informed consent was obtained from all individual participants for whom identifying information is
included in this article.
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In the wake of the CoE report, the EU—with the support of the USA—established
the ‘Special Investigative Task Force’ (SITF) to determine whether there were indeed
sufficient grounds for criminal investigations. In July 2014, the SITF reported that
organ harvesting had taken place ‘on a very limited scale’, but noted that there was
sufficient evidence of ‘a campaign of persecution that was directed at the ethnic Serb,
Roma, and other minority populations of Kosovo and towards fellow Kosovo Alba-
nians’. This was not, the report noted, the work of rogue individuals; rather, the acts
‘were conducted in an organised fashion and were sanctioned by certain individuals in
the top levels of the KLA leadership’ (Special Investigative Task Force 2014, 2).
There followed an international campaign to persuade the Government of Kosovo to
establish a special court to prosecute those involved; the need to create a court based
outside Kosovo and staffed by non-Kosovars was justified on the basis that it would
facilitate witness protection and guard against corruption and political interference, all
of which had previously impeded the work of Kosovo’s domestic courts, and those
courts established by both the UN and the EU within Kosovo (Cady and Booth 2004;
Mahr 2018; Muharremi 2019, 6–12). These attempts were initially resisted by the
Kosovo Assembly leading to ‘months of bitter arguments, street protests, frenzied
media speculation’ within Kosovo, as the international community sought to compel
the assembly to create the court through a series of threats and incentives (Ristic 2015).
In particular, the international community warned the government and the assembly
that if they did not create a special court, the UN Security Council would establish a
special tribunal outside Kosovo’s jurisdiction (Visoka 2017). The KSC was finally
established by the Kosovo Assembly in August 2015.
The court’s creation was heralded at the time as a means by which Kosovo could
provide justice for victims of past crimes. Additionally, beyond just serving as a means
to determine criminal liability and authorise censure, the court was also heralded as
contributing to transitional justice in Kosovo and explicitly framed as part of this
broader process (Visoka 2017, 13–16). In this respect, the KSC was seen as an integral
part of a broader strategy to forge a new relationship between both Serbs and Albanians
within Kosovo, and between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo, which would
facilitate peace, stability and prosperity throughout the region (Collaku and Ristic
2015). As noted by Gezim Visoka, though a strictly legal entity designed to enforce
criminal law, the KSC has also been presented as a body that can ‘contribute to ethnic
reconciliation and the resolution of outstanding inter-communal, societal and inter-state
issues, such as property restitution, sustainable return and reintegration, and peaceful
coexistence in public spaces and institutions’(2017, 24). Indicatively, a joint statement
by the USA and EU noted, ‘By dealing with its past and ensuring justice for the
victims, Kosovo can achieve reconciliation and build a better future’ (US Embassy in
Kosovo 2015). Likewise, Federica Mogherini—the High Representative of the Euro-
pean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—heralded the court as further
facilitating progress along ‘Kosovo’s European path’ (EU External Action 2015).
Normative Transitional Justice
Establishing criminal liability for human rights violations and atrocity crimes in post-
conflict societies has invariably been justified as essential not just because it provides
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victims with justice, but also because these proceedings as portrayed as catalysts for
societal transformation (Subotić 2009b, xii). In this sense, international criminal tribu-
nals and courts are viewed as part of a ‘range of measures’ employed within transitional
justice processes, and they are thus supported on the grounds that they will achieve
broader transformative goals beyond determining individual guilt and issuing punitive
redress (Murphy 2017, 1; see also, Annan 2004, 4).4 Indeed, so pervasive is the view
that international criminal courts and tribunals initiated in post-conflict societies con-
tribute to transitional justice, it is effectively impossible to identify any that have not
been explicitly supported on the basis that their proceedings will have transformative
effects beyond just the determination of guilt (Bachmann and Fatić 2015, 12–20).
There is no shortage of literature detailing both why transitional justice is necessary,
and how to best maximise its efficacy; indeed, according to Jelena Subotić, there now
exists, ‘a veritable international transitional justice industry’ (2009b, 4; see also, Dancy
and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2015; McEvoy 2018; Millar 2011). There are, of course, also
many critical perspectives (Ainley 2017; Kerr 2017; Paris 2010; Turner 2017;
Bachmann and Fatić 2015), but there is no doubt that in recent years, the arguments
in favour of transitional justice have been increasingly accepted by international
organisations such as the EU and the UN.
Why Transitional Justice?
At the core of the argument that transitional justice is necessary is the conviction that
victims have a right to justice; additionally, however, there is a less purely justice-
orientated rationale, namely, that in the absence of transitional justice conflict will
reoccur (Subotić 2009b, 3–5). The logic underpinning this claim was succinctly
articulated by Antonio Cassese, first president of the ICTY, when he argued that
without justice, ‘feelings of hatred and resentment seething below the surface will,
sooner or later, erupt and lead to renewed violence’ (Leebaw 2008, 113).
This point, which by definition presents the proceedings as future-orientated and
transformative, has been central to the EU and UN’s support for transitional justice.
Accordingly, the EU’s stated, ‘[we] firmly believe in the principle that there cannot be
lasting peace without justice’, and noted that transitional justice mechanisms including
criminal courts and tribunals, ‘significantly contribute to initiating post-conflict recov-
ery and in preventing the emergence of new cycles of violence’ (EU 2015, 12 & 10).
The UN’s widely cited 2004 report on transitional justice likewise asserted that peace
‘cannot be achieved’ if criminal liability for past crimes—and justice for the victims of
these crimes—is not achieved (Annan 2004, 3), a view echoed in later UN reports (Ki-
moon 2010; Ki-moon 2011). Given this belief in the causal relationship between
transitional justice and long-term peace, it is not surprising that the UN identified
transitional justice as ‘a critical component’ in its rule of law framework (Ki-moon
2010, 2), whilst the EU has variously described transitional justice as, ‘a key priority’
(Council of the EU 2015, 2) and, ‘an integral part of state- and peace-building [that]
should also be embedded in the wider crisis response, conflict prevention, security and
development efforts of the EU’ (EU 2015, 1).
4 The International Centre for Transitional Justice notes that criminal prosecutions are one of the four
‘approaches’ to transitional justice (2019).
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These views are shared by organisations working on transitional justice in the former
Yugoslavia; according to Jelena Krstic of the Humanitarian Law Centre Belgrade,
Transitional justice is necessary so that we don’t make the same mistakes again. If
people don’t know what happened in the past they will not be able to learn from it
and so avoid engaging in the same way again. In Yugoslavia we did not address
the legacy of World War II. People who were born after the war were told stories
about what the “others” did to their group and many believed this because there
was no alternative source (Krstic 2018).
Likewise, Bekim Blakaj, Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Center in
Pristina, suggested that in the absence of a transitional justice process comprising both
criminal proceedings and some form of truth and reconciliation initiative, it was ‘easy’
for each community in the former Yugoslavia to create myths about what happened in
the 1990s and that these myths had ‘a damaging effect on society and stability in the
region’ (Blakaj 2018).
How?
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the full spectrum of prescriptions
advanced by those who seek to bolster the efficacy of international courts and tribunals
associated with transitional justice. Rather, I will focus on one particular aspect which is
of particular relevance to the KSC, namely the need to ensure there is local ownership
so as to maximise the perceived legitimacy of the particular mechanism in operation
amongst the subject population (Clark 2014, 71).
Whilst there are a range of views as to the nature of the key positives effective
transitional justice mechanisms can produce, there is a widespread acceptance in the
literature that transitional justice mechanisms—especially courts and tribunals that
determine innocence and guilt—cannot be effective in the absence of popular legiti-
macy, understood as when the subject population accept the mandate of the court and
have ‘trust’ in both its procedures and enforcement mechanisms (Murphy 2017, 122–
123). Of course, by definition, a court established by a government has some legiti-
macy; yet, there is a distinction between what Hobbs describes as legitimacy derived
from the exercising of recognised authority and adherence to legal procedure, and
‘sociological legitimacy’, namely the acceptance by the subject population that the
court is necessary (2016, 494). As such, the normative basis upon which transitional
justice advocacy rests is the maintenance of public support for the particular mechanism
in operation (Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2015; Millar 2011). This legitimacy is
itself predicated on coordination between both the local populace and national author-
ities to ensure that the process develops from, and is embedded in, ‘the local commu-
nity level’ (Hoogenboom 2009, 184).
This view stems in large part from the experiences of previous courts and tribunals,
particularly the tribunals established for both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
Previous mechanisms which were not derived from local/national initiatives, but were
rather established by external actors and administered remotely by foreigners, have
been unable to connect with those they are presiding over, and thus, local perceptions of
their legitimacy have suffered. As Dustin Sharp notes, ‘justice initiatives felt to be
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illegitimate by those who have to live with them – because they have been imposed
from the outside or are seen as culturally alien – are unlikely to be successful in the long
term’ (2017, 412). The fate of the ICTY is regularly highlighted in this respect, and it
naturally has a particular salience for the KSC (Subotić 2014).
The ICTY’s judgements were on the whole not accepted as legitimate by the
majority of people in the former Yugoslavia as the court was ‘removed physically,
culturally, and politically from those who would live most intimately with its success or
failure’; the lack of both public involvement in the ICTY and negligible local judicial
participation ultimately, ‘contributed to a feeling among Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
Serbs that the work of the tribunal did not reflect their concerns, and therefore they
could not claim ownership in the judicial process’ (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004, 32–
33). As a result of the lack of a direct connection between the general public and the
ICTY, ‘…the tribunal’s public image has suffered and its legitimacy has been compro-
mised’ (Ibid, 30). Subotić likewise notes that whilst the ICTYwas presented as part of a
broader transformative project of transitional justice for Yugoslavia’s successor states,
its proceedings failed to resonate with the general public across the region, whilst the
various governments invariably dismissed any unfavourable judgements; as a result,
she argues, the ICTY ‘only brought new layers of denial’ (2009b, xii). Echoing this,
Milan Antonijević—Executive Director of the Open Society Foundation in Serbia—
noted that Serbs have generally proved willing to accept judgements sanctioning
Serbian soldiers and commanders for crimes committed during the course of the wars
in the former Yugoslavia only if they are issued by their own national courts as, ‘they
have close links with the people, as opposed to something that’s coming from The
Hague’ (Antonijević 2018).
This physical distance between the people on the ground and the judgements issued
by the ICTY in The Hague was compounded by a lack of engagement by the ICTY
with the general public in Yugoslavia’s successor states. In outlining why the ICTY
‘very successfully failed’, Marijana Toma of the Humanitarian Lawn Centre in Bel-
grade noted;
I think that what failed was the message from the ICTY. The outreach was a
disaster. Especially in the last six or seven years they looked like their purpose
was to exist for themselves, not for the region or the people here. Another thing
that was wrong was the vanity of the judges and the presidents of the ICTY…It
was clear that they didn’t care about the opinions of victim’s communities, from
the region (Toma 2018).
She criticised the ICTY’s engagement with local NGOs and activists as well as the
general public; noting that her organisation sought to support the work of the ICTY, she
reflected, ‘we didn’t get much support. We felt abandoned’. Likewise, Jovana
Radosavljevic of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Serbia noted, ‘the ICTY
failed to engage with people from here. There was no outreach’ (Radosavljevic 2018).
The lack of domestic support for the ICTY and the failings in its own public engage-
ment strategy—and the detrimental effect this in turn had on perceptions of its
legitimacy—has had, many have argued, not just an adverse effect on the pursuit of
justice but also an ongoing detrimental impact on peace and stability in the former
Yugoslavia. The ICTY, though focused on the forensic investigation of events and the
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publication of binding judgements designed to prove that myriad injustices occurred and
that particular protagonists were culpable, was invariably perceived as ‘biased’ or ‘alien’
as it could not—by virtue of its composition and design—engage with public and thus
counter the fundamentally ‘irrational’ beliefs they continue to hold (Milanovic 2016).
Sonja Biserko—president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia—points
to the ‘extreme ethnification of states’ which has occurred throughout the former Yugo-
slavia since the end of the conflicts in the 1990s, one which is characterised by ‘new
identities built on invented histories and mythology’ which the ICTY’s judgements have
failed to counter (Biserko 2018).
The legacy of the 1990s thus remains a potent factor in the everyday lives of people
throughout the former Yugoslavia; indeed, according to Radosavljevic, this legacy is
‘killing our societies slowly because it is effecting us all’ (Radosavljevic 2018). In fact,
throughout the former Yugoslavia, a backlash against the ICTY has ‘strengthened the
political fortunes of the nationalists’ who have paradoxically benefited from being
sanctioned by the ICTY (Peskin and Boduszyn’ski 2011, 53; see also, Subotić 2014,
172). Indicatively, a 2017 public opinion survey in Serbia, evaluating the legacy of the
ICTY, points to it having a limited, if not in fact negative, impact on the ground; the
results of the survey ‘confirms that there is overwhelming public distrust in the ICTY
and its findings’ (Kostić 2018). Likewise, the survey found ‘those convicted by the
“anti-Serb” ICTY are not guilty in the public’s view’, and this has facilitated ‘revision-
ism in Serbia which has in recent years been accompanied by the glorification of war
criminals and their return to public office’ (Ibid). The survey also confirmed that
despite the ICTY being presented as a means by which wounds can be healed and
reconciliation achieved, ‘the people in the former Yugoslavia are in fact further away
from each other than ever’ (Ibid).
The prescriptions based on the lessons learned from past experiences of international
courts and tribunals that lacked public legitimacy—especially the ICTY—is not con-
fined to academia; it has become a key refrain in both the UN and EU’s prescriptions.
The UN’s 2004 report warned against ‘[the use of] foreign experts, foreign models and
foreign-conceived solutions to the detriment of durable improvements and sustainable
capacity’ (Annan 2004, 6); noted that success is conditional on ‘the quantity and quality
of public and victim consultation carried out’ (Ibid, 7); and highlighted the need for ‘an
effective communications strategy’ that ensures the public are informed of all devel-
opments related to the working of the transitional justice mechanism in operation (Ibid,
15–16). Indeed, the framework concluded, ‘Ultimately, no rule of law reform, justice
reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be
successful or sustainable’ (Ibid, 7). This view has also been reaffirmed in later UN
strategy documents (Ki-moon 2011, 6–9).
The EU has also endorsed this idea, stressing the need to ensure that transitional
justice mechanisms, especially courts and tribunals, are both derived from, and em-
bedded in, the local society and political institutions (Council of the European Union
2015: 2). Indicatively, the EU’s most recent framework states, ‘Transitional justice can
only reach its goals if the process of its design and implementation is nationally and
locally-owned…It is essential that the process is initiated and driven by government
authorities and local civil society (EU 2015, 8).
Yet, despite the widespread consensus regarding the failings of the ICTY, and
the myriad-related prescriptions from academic experts and the EU and the UN,
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on the need for local ownership and engagement, the manner in which the KSC
has been established, and the nature of its public engagement to date, runs
counter to these normative prescriptions; this is dealt with in the following
sections.
Perceptions of the Court
The dominant narrative articulated by international actors when they sought to
compel the Government of Kosovo to establish the KSC was that it was
necessary to ensure Kosovo’s future prosperity and stability; the court was
ultimately heralded as an essential condition for Kosovo’s transition to full
integration in the international community of states (US Embassy in Kosovo
2015; EU External Action 2015). Given Kosovo’s contested status—and the
attendant negatives that derive from this—the prospect of attaining international
recognition and affirmation was a particularly compelling argument for Kosovo’s
Government and Assembly members (Visoka 2017, 24). Yet, despite the signif-
icant positives predicted to be derived from the court, the evidence shows that
the KSC lacks domestic and political support, and is widely misunderstood
within Kosovo. Additionally, the KSC’s outreach campaign has had minimal
impact on the public within Kosovo, in large part because it has not received
support from the Government of Kosovo.
Political and Public Support
Many MPs who supported the establishment of the court in Kosovo’s Assembly
strongly opposed the court in principle; however, because of the various promises
made by influential external actors about the court’s impact on Kosovo’s future status,
they endorsed the creation of the KSC on instrumental grounds. Indicatively, the then
Prime Minister Hashim Thaci supported the court in the Assembly whilst at the same
time describing it as ‘the biggest injustice and insult which could be done to Kosovo
and its people’ (Hopkins 2014). Thaci subsequently declared he only supported the
court because he was ‘under great pressure from the international community’ (B92
2018). Thus, from its inception, the KSC, though nominally a Kosovo court established
by the Kosovo Assembly, lacked genuine political support amongst MPs, and neither
was it created by the Assembly in response to domestic public pressure. The politicians
who voted for the establishment of the court did so for purely instrumental reasons; as
noted by Blakaj,
The court could not have been established if it was not for the pressure exercised
by the US on the Kosovo parliament…those who have spoken in support of it do
so for the wrong reasons…[they] are not thinking about the victims, or about
justice (Blakaj 2018).
As a result of the manner in which it was established, the KSC was immediately seen,
according to Anna Myriam Roccatello of the International Centre for Transitional
Justice, ‘as another internationally driven initiative’ (Roccatello 2017). Establishing a
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court—particularly one presented as contributing to the achievement of transitional
justice—for reasons of expediency clearly does not cohere with the normative under-
standing of what the primary motivations should be; this phenomenon, whereby
domestic governments agree to establish courts and/or tribunals only to appease
external actors, has been identified in other contexts as corrosive to the actual processes
established (Subotić 2009b, 35).
Since its establishment, the KSC has failed to generate any notable increase in
political support with most major political parties remaining hostile to the court; whilst
the LDK and Vetëvendosje have been less aggressively disposed towards the court,
neither has actively championed the KSC’s cause and thus, there has been no political
movement speaking up forcefully for the court amongst the general public. Following
Kosovo’s general election in 2017, a new government was formed comprising a ‘war-
wing’ coalition of parties —the PDK, AAK and NISMA—each led by former KLA
commanders5; unsurprisingly—given their intimate links to the KLA—this coalition
has not put much effort into supporting the activities of the court, or bolstering
perceptions of the court’s legitimacy amongst the general public. In fact, in December
2017, a group of MPs from within the coalition attempted to revoke the KSC in
Kosovo’s Assembly. The campaign was abandoned only after extraordinary interna-
tional pressure was brought to bear on Kosovo’s government and legislators. The US
Ambassador to Kosovo warned at the time, ‘This effort, if it succeeds, will have
profoundly negative implications for Kosovo’s future as part of Europe. It will be
considered by the United States as a stab in the back’, adding that Kosovo would be
‘choosing isolation instead of cooperation’ if the initiative succeeded (Popova 2017).
The UK Ambassador to Kosovo likewise warned such a move would ‘have grave
consequences for Kosovo’ (Ibid). Additionally, ‘the Quint’—France, Germany, Italy,
UK and USA—warned that anyone who supported the initiative to revoke the KSC,
‘…will be rejecting Kosovo’s partnership with our countries’, and noted there would be
‘severe negative consequences, including for Kosovo’s international and Euro-Atlantic
integration, if Kosovo continues on this path’ (US Embassy in Kosovo 2018).
The extent to which the KSC was created as a result of external pressure was
reflected in the course of the two workshops held in Pristina with Kosovo Albanians
and representatives from all Kosovo’s major political parties in 2018.6 One participant
noted that whilst the court is formally a Kosovo court, Kosovo’s citizens and politicians
did not voluntarily choose to establish it; rather, he argued, ‘The court was established
by force; like in The Godfather, the internationals said “I will make you an offer you
can’t refuse”’. Another stated, ‘There is little local ownership of the court and as a result
people do not believe in it’. All participants agreed that the issue could, and should
have been dealt with by the various judicial bodies previously mandated to administer
justice in Kosovo, such as the UNMIK courts, the ICTY, EULEX and Kosovo’s own
judicial system; ‘how many courts does Kosovo need?’ one participant asked rhetor-
ically. Some argued that the KSC was ‘a Russian plot’ designed to destabilise the
region, whilst others suggested the court was established primarily to serve as a means
by which to keep particular Kosovo politicians in line; the KSC was thus described by
5 The leaders are Kadri Veseli (PDK), Ramush Haradinaj (AAK) and Fatmir Limaj (NISMA).
6 The political parties represented at the workshop were the PDK, LDK, NISMA, Vetëvendosje, AKR and the
AAK. Other political parties were invited but chose not to attend.
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one as, ‘a sword of Damocles hanging over [President] Thaci’s head’. There was
widespread consensus that the KSC was not established solely to pursue justice and/
or foster reconciliation; rather, the international actors who demanded the creation of
the court were allegedly impelled by particular national interests and political motives,
though there was significant disagreement as to what these ‘real’ motives were.
Few doubted that crimes had indeed been committed by the KLA, though the
consensus—at least amongst PDK, NISMA and AAK representatives—was that they
were on a limited scale and committed by ‘rogue’ KLA operatives. All participants
agreed that the court’s remit—uncovering crimes committed by the KLA—was ex-
tremely politically sensitive, and thus, few politicians wanted to be seen to side with an
institution that appears to be committed to undermining one of Kosovo’s core founda-
tional narratives, namely the ‘heroic’ struggle waged by the KLA. To do so, one noted,
would be ‘political suicide’. Thus, politicians in Kosovo agreed to the creation of the
KSC under duress, but once it was established, they have been either actively hostile
towards it or at best ambivalent; ‘we all know what happened in 1999’ one participant
noted, ‘we don’t need this court to tell us. No party in Kosovo wants to be linked to this
revisionism’.
The evidence collected in this study suggests that the absence of political support for
the court has had an adverse effect on public support for the KSC. In a poll conducted
in mid-2017, 76.4% of ethnic Albanians within Kosovo believed the court’s focus was
‘unfair’ (Visoka 2017, 27). Blakaj, likewise agreed, noting, ‘most of the Albanian
community believe the court is biased’ (Blakaj 2018). Aworkshop convened in Pristina
with Kosovo Serbs also evidenced little faith in the KSC7; most claimed that the court
was unlikely to go after ‘the big fish’ and that it was the result of a deal between the
internationals and local corrupt elite. As one participant noted, ‘The internationals did
nothing to stop the Albanian mafia taking over after the war. Everyone knows who
killed who back then, but the internationals didn’t arrest those involved because they
wanted to be friends with them’. Another claimed, ‘There is too much corruption here
for this to work. The internationals are corrupt too and they allow corruption to take
place inside Kosovo’.
The KSC’s Outreach and Public Knowledge
As highlighted earlier, the need for ongoing public engagement with transitional
justice mechanisms once they have been initiated is widely cited in the literature
outlining how to maximise the efficacy of these processes (Sharp 2017; Dancy and
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2015; Millar 2011). Linked to the issue of domestic political and
public support, the need for public engagement is cited as vital if the transitional
justice mechanism is to maintain popular legitimacy; the EU notes, ‘Outreach
activities, including public consultation, media engagement and the dissemination
of information [are] crucial for any transitional justice process’ so as ‘to avoid or
correct misinterpretations and to manage expectations’ (EU 2015, 8). Likewise, the
UN’s prescriptions note, ‘Without public awareness and education campaigns, and
public consultation initiatives, public understanding of, and support for, national
reform efforts will not be secured’ (Annan 2004, 7).
7 Participants at the workshop took part on condition that their contributions would be anonymised.
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As detailed in the previous section, from its inception, the KSC lacked domestic
political and public support due to the fact that was established through the leveraging
of external pressure. This absence of domestic support enabled those opposed to the
court within Kosovo to proliferate various negative theories and erroneous claims about
the KSC’s remit, procedures and ‘true’ intentions. As Blakaj noted, ‘It is not just the
general public who oppose the court; many lawyers, politicians, and academics have
spoken against it and spread speculation and rumours. These lies have not been
challenged enough’ (Blakaj 2018).
This hostile propaganda could have potentially been countered had the KSC been
able to implement an effective public information campaign within Kosovo designed to
educate the population about the court’s procedures and remit. Yet, whilst the KSC has
itself made a concerted effort to implement such a campaign (Kosovo Specialist
Chambers 2018, 28–32), this has thus far failed to adequately redress the negative
perceptions about the court. This is due to a combination of factors; on the one hand,
despite the widely held view that the ICTY failed to engage sufficiently with people on
the ground, many claim the KSC has similarly undertaken a largely remote public
relations campaign. Secondly, and of arguably greater importance, the KSC’s attempts
to explain itself and bolster its public legitimacy are, to a significant extent, dependant
on the active support of the Government of Kosovo; yet, as noted previously, the
government—especially that elected in 2017—has maintained a steadfastly hostile
stance towards the KSC, thereby impacting on the efficacy of the KSC’s own public
relations campaign. Each of these issues is discussed in turn below.
Since its establishment, the KSC—mindful of the sensitive nature of the issues under its
remit amongst the majority Albanian population in Kosovo—has sought to conduct an
effective outreach programme. Avis Beneš, Head of Public Information and Communi-
cation Unit at the KSC, noted, ‘there was a lot of suspicion and scepticism in advance
about the court’, and as a consequence, ‘this court has to put extra effort in being perceived
as credible and legitimate’ (Beneš 2017). To this end, the KSC immediately established
the Public Information and Communication Unit which coordinates outreach. The KSC
website has a specific outreach section where multilingual factsheets about the court’s
establishment, remit and working methods are available (Kosovo Specialist Chambers
2019a). There is also a YouTube channel run by the KSC hosting a number of videos
about the court’s work (Kosovo Specialist Chambers 2019b). The KSC have organised
public meetings in Kosovo to explain their work, and held information events in The
Hague, and in Kosovo’s main urban centres, as well as in Serb-majority towns such as
Gracinica and NorthMitrovica (Kosovo Specialist Chambers 2019c). According to Guido
Acquaviva, Deputy Registrar at the KSC, these various initiatives illustrate the KSC’s
‘commitment to enhance outreach to a much higher extent than ordinary domestic courts
and tribunals’ (Acquaviva 2017). In January 2018, the Swiss government provided the
KSC with a grant specifically for outreach which will result, according to Beneš, in ‘an
intensification of activities in next two years’ (Beneš 2017).
Yet, despite the outreach efforts undertaken to date, the public within both Kosovo
and Serbia evidently do not know enough about court. Indicatively, Blakaj lamented
what he described as, ‘a very bad deficit of understanding amongst the public and
experts’ in Kosovo about the court, noting ‘The basic principles of transitional justice
have not been explained to our people’ (Blakaj 2018). According to a representative
from the OSCE, the KSC has simply failed to establish a means by which it can engage
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with the general public in Kosovo; the outreach activities undertaken to date have been
conducted ‘at an elite level beyond the reach of the vast majority of ordinary people’,
and as a result, ‘The basic principles of transitional justice haven’t been spoken about
enough here’ (OSCE 2018).
At a workshop with Kosovo Serbs held in Pristina in 2018, all agreed that that the
KSC had not been adequately explained to them. ‘No-one hear talks about it’ was one
view, whilst another participant stated, ‘We have been given very little information
about the court. We don’t understand it; this is especially the case in rural and poorer
areas’. Civil society organisations working on transitional justice in Kosovo and Serbia
likewise complained that much of the KSC’s outreach was cosmetic; according to
Toma, ‘The court may have information on their website, but how will they explain
what they are doing to some elderly guy in Kosovo who doesn’t get that information
and will go to a demonstration to throw tear-gas at the assembly?’ (Toma 2018). Given
that many Kosovo Serbs—who bore the brunt of the KLA’s crimes—fled to Serbia
once NATO’s intervention ended, many civil society activists in Belgrade argued that
the KSC needed to engage with the Serbian public and civil society organisations.
Indicatively, Radosavljevic, noted, ‘if the court is discussed here it’s misinterpreted’,
and she argued, ‘[The KSC] should have some presence here in Belgrade. They should
communicate with our people here, our journalists, organise workshops in high schools,
and cooperate with NGOs…Right now it’s perceived as something happening “far
away” in The Hague’ (Radosavljevic 2018).
Yet, whilst the KSC’s outreach strategy and activities to date have been criticised by
many, there is a limit to what the KSC can do; in practice, the impact of their public
relations strategy on the general public is heavily dependent on the degree to which the
Kosovo government itself supports the court and its public relations strategy. Indeed,
representatives from the KSC were keen to emphasise that whilst the KSC understands
the need for public relations, it is not the exclusive, or primary, task of the KSC to
explain itself or bolster its legitimacy. As noted by the Acquaviva, the KSC is a Kosovo
judicial body, ‘established by the Kosovo Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the
elected representatives’ and it derives its legitimacy primarily from this fact (Acquaviva
2017). Thus, he noted, those who question its necessity or remit should direct their
concerns to the Government of Kosovo and the Assembly that established it, rather
than just the KSC itself. As such, the KSC cannot reasonably be expected, once
established by Kosovo’s government and Assembly, to thereafter consolidate its own
legitimacy without the support of these national institutions. Indeed, this coheres with
broader reflections on the need for any international court framed as a transitional
justice mechanism to be complemented by additional domestic institutional support—
what Fletcher and Weinstein describe as ‘a parallel structure’—that can explain the
court’s procedures, and ultimately promote, ‘the moral lessons that emerge from these
trials’ (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004, 44).
In practice, as noted earlier, governmental efforts to bolster the legitimacy of the
KSC amongst the population within Kosovo have been manifestly lacking due to the
fact that many within the current government have intimate links to the KLA. Yet, the
problem is that the need for governmental support is widely regarded as vital if the
legitimacy of any transitional justice mechanism is to be upheld domestically (Subotić
2009a, 363). As Roccatello noted, it is particularly vital that governments engage with
local civil society groups to enable them to ‘undertake constant and relentless work’ so
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that they can explain both the basic principles of transitional justice and the remit and
procedures of the particular court/tribunal in operation. Yet, Roccatello noted, ‘I don’t
think the Government have explained the court’s purpose and procedures to the people.
They are playing a double game’ (Roccatello 2017). This view was echoed by
Antonijević; for the KSC to have popular legitimacy in Kosovo, he argued, it’s
procedures and remit needed to be understood, and this required ‘a strong civil society’,
one that was, crucially, both protected and supported by the government. But, he noted,
‘I do not see that kind of readiness in Pristina’ (Antonijević 2018). This was not, most
claimed, unintentional; many argued that the Kosovo government, for reasons of self-
preservation, have a vested interest in degrading public support for the KSC. According
to one participant at the political party workshop, ‘The court has been misused as a
propaganda tool for the elite’. Those based in Serbia also criticised the Serbian
government’s near-complete unwillingness to provide information about the court to
the public or support civil society organisations in their efforts to explain the court’s
role (Antonijević 2018; Radosavljevic 2018).
The Dangers of the Lack of Local Legitimacy
The KSC, as is clear, was established because of external pressure; indeed, according to
Biserko, it was ‘forced’ upon Kosovo by the international community (Biserko 2018).
This clearly undermined the perceived legitimacy of the KSC amongst the people of
Kosovo from its inception, and the ongoing lack of political support within Kosovo for
the KSC has continued to impede the court’s popular legitimacy. Those in the Kosovo
Assembly who voted to establish the KSC did so not out of a desire to either pursue
justice or respond to public pressure; rather, they did so essentially for purely instru-
mental reasons related to the perceived need to appease external sponsors who
demanded the court be created. This, therefore, coheres with Subotić’s analysis of the
manner in which some states express compliance with international law but only
superficially; ‘[they] do so for window dressing, in order to appease international
pressure’ (2009a, 363). The problem with initiatives established for such instrumental
reasons, she noted, is that they invariably become ‘stalled’ and additionally, lead to
‘more domestic resistance’ (Ibid, 380).
The manner in which the KSCwas established, and its related lack of legitimacy, thus
poses potentially grave future problems for the KSC’s proceedings, and indeed societal
stability in Kosovo. Naturally—as was the case with respect to the ICTY—the absence
of popular support for the court is highly likely to impact negatively both on cooperation
with the KSC and the public’s reaction to its judgements (Subotić 2014). With respect to
cooperation, it has been widely noted that the KSCwill face significant barriers securing
witness testimony due to both the honour system within Albanian society and the
likelihood of witness intimidation (Crosby and Zejneli 2019). The chances of an
institution widely perceived as illegitimate overcoming these already significant obsta-
cles are naturally reduced. In terms of the public reaction, as has been widely noted with
respect to the ICTY, courts which lack popular legitimacy may in fact incite a ‘blow-
back’ as their judgements—whether prosecution or acquittals—can increase support
for, rather than discredit, the ideologies and political movements which caused the
original conflict (Subotić 2014, 172–175; see also, Peskin and Boduszyn’ski 2011,
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53). Whilst the court’s proceedings may well be conducted according to the highest
judicial standards, this in itself is unlikely to convince those who oppose it on emotional
grounds; as Marko Milanovic noted with respect to the ICTY’s judgements;
People who have established their beliefs about various events in Yugoslav wars
emotionally, as a core part of their identity, are not, and cannot be, fully rational.
They are not going to be dissuaded by 1000-page judgments in legalese English
or French that nobody ever even reads (Milanovic 2016).
The KSC is charged with dealing with a particularly emotive issue which goes to
the heart of contemporary Kosovo Albanian identity, namely the ‘heroic’ war
fought by the KLA against Serbian oppressors. The popular—and officially
endorsed—national narrative comprises a stark binary between the aggressor—
Serbia—and the victims—the Kosovo Albanians—which is deeply entrenched in
the popular psyche (Visoka 2017, 27–29). The KSC will—by definition—chal-
lenge this narrative by demonstrating that the KLA—or at the very least KLA
operatives—in fact engaged in oppressive, at times murderous, behaviour against
Serbian civilians, as well as fellow Kosovo Albanians. Clearly, this aspect of the
conflict cannot but compromise the national narrative.
The KSC’s proceedings will by definition, therefore, as one workshop partic-
ipant noted, ‘blur the line between the victims and the perpetrators’ and evoke a
strong emotional reaction. Given the pronounced absence of pre-existing domestic
support for the court, its judgements are thus more likely to spark outrage. The
experiences of the ICTY suggest that this outrage is likely to in fact generate
renewed support for those accused/indicted. Indeed, reflecting on the trials of two
prominent contemporary Kosovo Albanian politicians at the ICTY, one workshop
participant noted,
What the KLA did were not “crimes” according to the people who were involved
and the wider public who support them. You can see how Fatmir Limaj and
Ramush Haradinaj received more support after they were sent to the ICTY. They
were then seen as heroes.8
Thus, rather than promoting peace and reconciliation, as promised by the KSC’s external
supporters, the court proceedings could well serve as a boon for the very movements—
characterised by aggressive nationalism—which continue to impede reconciliation be-
tween Kosovo’s Serbian and Albanian communities. As Milica Kostić warned,
There is no reason to doubt that the indictments and eventual judgments will
produce the same polarized reactions in both Serbia and Kosovo, just as with the
ICTY, and that the court will be able to do little or nothing to shift entrenched
nationalist narratives about the conflict (Kostić 2018).
8 Fatmir Limaj—current Minister for Trade and leader of the political party NISMA—is a former KLA
commander who was sent to the ICTY in March 2003; he was acquitted in November 2005. Ramush
Haradinaj—current Prime Minster of Kosovo and leader of the political party AAK—is a former KLA
commander who was sent to the ICTY in March 2005; he was acquitted in April 2008.
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Many participants at the workshops, indeed, predicted that indictments or prosecu-
tions could spark domestic unrest, particularly inter-ethnic tension. The proceedings,
many warned, will inevitably reignite disputes over the causes, and nature, of the
violence in the late 1990s; in the absence of political and public support for the court,
nationalists will stoke up hostilities amongst the general public, whilst those directly
involved in any trials, ‘will seek revenge’. Whilst only a minority predicted large-scale
conflict, this was cited as a distinct possibility given the fact the court lacks popular
support, and those opposed to it are likely to exploit both the popular sense that the
court is illegitimate and wounded Kosovo Albanian national pride.
The KSC has, additionally, been tasked with operating at a particularly fragile period
in Kosovo’s history; despite the optimism which prevailed—at least amongst the
Albanian community—when Kosovo declared independence in 2008, Kosovo con-
tinues to suffer from an array of problems which have contributed to a steady increase
in popular frustration and disquiet. Kosovo’s unemployment rate remains very high
(World Bank 2019), its education system was ranked in the bottom five internationally
(OECD 2015) and corruption remains a perennial problem (Transparency International
2019); the combination of these factors has led to very high levels of immigration.
Kosovo’s development and international integration also continues to be impeded by its
inability to join a number of international organisations; Serbia and Russia have
successfully orchestrated campaigns to block Kosovo from joining UNESCO and
Interpol, whilst Kosovo’s prospects of NATO and EU membership remain remote
given that many existing members—in particular Spain—are opposed to its admission.
Kosovo’s citizens are also the only people—with the exception of Belarus—west of
Russia who still need a visa to travel to the EU, an issue which continues to cause
widespread societal anger (Xhambazi 2019).
Thus, the contemporary public mood in Kosovo is neither content nor optimistic;
given this backdrop, the proceedings and judgements of the KSC are potentially
incendiary. Transitional justice is ultimately disruptive in that it is orientated towards
‘advancing political transformation’ (Leebaw 2008, 97); yet, given both the underlying
societal unease and the highly emotive nature of the issues under the court’s jurisdic-
tion, it is debatable whether any ‘political transformation’ generated in Kosovo by the
KSC will necessarily be positive.
Conclusion: the Same Mistakes Again?
One of the core justifications for establishing international courts and tribunals in post-
conflict societies is that a failure to do will fundamentally undermine the process of
transitional justice, and thus, conflict will occur again in the future. As noted by Krstic,
‘Transitional justice is necessary so that we don’t make the same mistakes again’ (Krstic
2018).Whilst the KSC itself claimed, ‘…many valuable lessons learned from other courts
dealing with international crimes were applied during the establishment of the Kosovo
Specialist Chambers’ (Kosovo Specialist Chambers 2018, 6), the charge of making ‘the
same mistakes again’ can in fact be levelled against those who pushed through the
establishment of the KSC despite the clear lack of domestic support in Kosovo.
Since its establishment, the KSC—despite the efforts of its own outreach
strategy—has been unable to significantly bolster its domestic legitimacy within
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Kosovo; in the absence of any significant political support, negative and erroneous
propaganda has proliferated and public understanding of, and support for, the KSC
has suffered. Yet, this can hardly be deemed a surprise; both the academic literature
and the policy prescriptions of organisations like the UN and the EU have long
noted the central importance of domestic support for international court, and all
transitional justice mechanisms, before they are established if they are to be
successful. As noted by the UN, ‘Countless pre-designed or imported projects,
however meticulously well-reasoned and elegantly packaged, have failed…Civil
society organizations, national legal associations, human rights groups and advo-
cates of victims and the vulnerable must all be given a voice in these processes’
(Annan 2004, 7).
Yet, as has been detailed above, the KSC was established by the Government and the
Assembly of Kosovo because of external pressure, rather than in response to domestic
support. This thus clearly contrasts with the academic scholarship on how international
courts framed as transitional justice mechanisms should originate, but also the pre-
scriptions advanced by the UN and, ironically, by the EU itself; despite describing local
ownership and local legitimacy as ‘essential to ensure successful transitional justice
processes’ (Council of the European Union 2015: 35), the EU was to the fore in
pressurising the Government and Assembly of Kosovo to establish the KSC, and it is
the EU which finances the court.
Beyond just the fact that the court’s relationship with the general public fails to meet
the ideal advanced, this lack of public support constitutes a potential threat to peace and
stability in Kosovo; the KSC is tasked with passing judgement on the activities of the
KLA and thus challenging a key aspect of the Kosovo Albanian national identity. To do
so in the absence of public and political support within Kosovo is naturally dangerous
given the likely backlash.
It is well documented that the ICTY’s proceedings failed to lead to significant
reconciliation on the ground, or at an inter-state level, in the former Yugoslavia, and
that in fact nationalism and historical revisionism are on the rise (Mujanovic 2018;
Subotić 2014; Clark 2014, 5). Many have detailed why this happened; Fletcher and
Weinstein’s analysis is broadly representative of these views and finds that there was a
‘...striking lack of understanding’ amongst the public about the procedures and work of
the tribunal’; ‘sporadic contact’ between the ICTY and people on the ground; and,
owing to an overwhelmingly hostile political environment, unchecked negative press
coverage was allowed to flourish which ultimately ‘served to undermine [the ICTY’s]
credibility and legitimacy within the region’ (Fletcher and Weinstein 2004, 33–40).
Unfortunately, the evidence presented here suggests that each of these mistakes is being
made again with respect to the KSC.
Ultimately, any judicial mechanism imposed from outside will by definition
suffer a legitimacy problem that will impede the achievement of effective transi-
tional justice; evidence from around the world suggests that a lack of legitimacy
leads to ‘resentment, resistance, and ultimately co-optation’ (Sharp 2017, 412). The
efficacy of the KSC—at least in terms of its purported capacity to enable the people
for Kosovo to ‘achieve reconciliation’ (US Embassy in Kosovo 2015)—is thus in
some doubt. As noted by one workshop participant, ‘The ICTY didn’t have a
positive impact on reconciliation because it lacked legitimacy. It’s impossible to
promote reconciliation through coercion’.
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The KSC is, of course, a reality; as such, rather than just lament its origins, there
is a pressing need to bolster its legitimacy to prevent its proceedings impacting
negatively on peace and stability in Kosovo. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this
article to advance a detailed set of proposals on how this may be achieved, drawing
on the existing research into how to implement effective international courts and
transformative transitional justice mechanisms—as well as the qualitative research
noted above—broad prescriptions can be identified. The KSC must firstly ensure
that its working methods and proceedings are as transparent as possible; naturally,
there are limits to how open any court can be, but the KSC must endeavour to
demonstrate that it is working to the highest standards in an accessible way. Second,
given the stance adopted by the Kosovo government, the KSC must do more to
increase its own independent public relations activities; in particular, the KSC should
consider the suggestions made by a number of interviewees that it establishes a
permanent presence in both Kosovo and Serbia (Radosavljevic 2018; Blakaj 2018).
This would enable the KSC to appear less ‘remote’ whilst also ensuring it had more
direct access to the public in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the domestic media in
both. Finally, and arguably most importantly, there is also clearly a pressing need to
actively counter the notion that the KSC is ‘one-sided’ given its focus on the
activities of the KLA; whilst court officials have stressed this—particularly the
KSC’s President (Centrum pro lidska prave a demokratizaci 2019)—this message
has clearly yet to resonate with the public. This message could be proliferated more
effectively through a more obvious on-the-ground presence as noted above, but it
must also be complemented by a more holistic strategy which seeks to show that
identifying criminality committed by some in the KLA does not constitute an
attempt to discredit the struggle for liberation from Milosevic’s oppression. The
KSC’s legitimacy, and thus ultimately its efficacy, is predicated on its ability to
initiate proceedings against former KLA combatants without being seen by Kosovo
Albanians as negating their suffering or tarnishing their heroes; this requires crafting
a means by which the public in Kosovo can be convinced of the true nature of the
conflict, so that they can accept that some KLA criminality occurred, whilst
maintaining their conviction that the KLA’s cause was just. This could be achieved
through more closely working with civil society organisations in Kosovo, such as
the Humanitarian Law Centre which has, since its establishment, sought to docu-
ment the facts relating to the violence in Kosovo. The Humanitarian Law Centre has
no political agenda, and, whilst it has compiled extensive evidence of the scale of
the crimes committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo, it has also documented crimes
committed against minorities—and ‘moderate’ Albanians—by the KLA
(Humanitarian Law Centre 2019; Blakaj 2018). As an organisation with a good
reputation, run by Kosovars, the Humanitarian Law Centre can more convincingly
articulate a history of the conflict which acknowledges criminality committed by the
KLA than the KSC; if this narrative was more broadly proliferated and accepted
within Kosovo—through education programmes and public relations exercises—then
the proceedings of the KSC—especially its prosecutions—are likely to generate less
societal backlash, or be as easily discredited and distorted by unscrupulous political
elites, as routinely happened in the case of the ICTY (Subotić 2014; Clark 2014).
Funding Fieldwork for this project was part-funded by Robert Bosch Stiftung.
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